Thursday, May 29, 2008

China Water: May 29, 2008: |Water quality in Taihu Lake.

At times it seems that to get a picture of events in China, it's interesting that instead of getting reports on problems, such as happens in the USA and many other countries with a less controlled media, one instead gets reports on how problems are being fixed.

After a while, however, one can begin to read around the lines, and get a more complete picture of the overall situation.

Peter Huston

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http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/29/content_8272716.htm


Water quality stable in China's once algae-choked lake
www.chinaview.cn 2008-05-29 00:02:22 Print

SHANGHAI, May 28 (Xinhua) -- The water quality at China's Taihu Lake remained stable and no algae outbreak would happen in the near future, the water resources authority said on Wednesday, one year after the algae-choked lake turned nearly one million residents' tap water undrinkable for about 10 days.

"The water quality at the lake and its source remains stable," said Ye Jianchun, chief of the Taihu Basin Authority of China's Ministry of Water Resources.

The indices of algae-related chemicals, such as ammonia and nitrogen, were decreasing while the water channeled from the Yangtze River helped accelerate the water flow and thus hampered the algae growth, he added.

The lake, China's third largest body of freshwater, suffered from an algae outbreak at the end of May last year, affecting a large number of residents in Wuxi City.

According to the latest statistics, 92 percent of the lake was at a moderate level of nutrient enrichment, which means the algae would not endanger the water quality and no algae outbreak would happen in the near future, Ye said.

Blue-green algae, which exists widely in water bodies and is not harmful itself, grows easily in polluted water with a high concentration of nitrogen and phosphorous and a temperature of around 18 degrees Celsius.

An excess of blue-green algae removes oxygen from the water, killing fish and other aquatic life, which then decay and release toxin.

No large areas of algae had been spotted in the lake and water supply to neighboring cities was normal, Ye said.

About 30 million people in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and Shanghai rely on Taihu Lake as a drinking water source.
Editor: Yan Liang

China Media: May 29, 2008: Protests in quake zones.

As always, this is not a blog devoted to Chinese media issues bur from time to time it is beneficial to touch on them.

Putting on my Asian studies scholar hat, commentary about this story would go along the following lines; the prevailing atmosphere of corruption in China, a long history of peasant uprisings when conditions become too harsh to be perceived as bearable, perhaps a reference to natural disasters being seen as heaven showing displeasure with the rulers (perhaps), and the use of modern recording technology to ensure the message is spread as far and wide as possible.

Peter Huston
===

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-protests29-2008may29,0,5264936.story



In China, protests flare over quake aid
Though the central government has been widely applauded for its relief efforts, some local officials have been accused of corruption.

By Don Lee, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
May 29, 2008
LUOJIANG, CHINA -- This county in Sichuan province sustained relatively little damage from the devastating May 12 earthquake. But nine days later, Luojiang felt one of the biggest political aftershocks: Thousands of residents jammed a public square here, demanding that local officials explain why relief supplies were misused.

The protesters, many of them young students, fought police with their fists and water bottles, witnesses said. They smashed police vehicles, even flipping one upside down.

* China eager to show it can handle Olympics and crisis

"The government was corrupted, so ordinary people were all protesting," said Yang, a 13-year-old student who left her family store nearby to participate.

The Chinese central government has been widely applauded for quickly and effectively mobilizing national resources for rescue and relief efforts, but the magnitude 7.9 quake and its aftermath have sparked anger toward local governments. In several cities and towns, residents have accused officials of corrupt acts, including taking the best tents for themselves and underreporting the extent of quake casualties so as not to draw scrutiny from Beijing.

Protests and complaints against local officials aren't rare, but what's different is that the grievances are being captured on television or being reported by a press that has traditionally been tightly controlled but has had more freedom in the immediate aftermath of the natural disaster.

As well, parents whose children were killed are protesting the failure of local leaders to provide answers about why so many schools collapsed while structures around them, including government buildings, remained standing. Some believe local officials are trying to cover up shoddy construction.

In Mianzhu, villagers clashed with police Sunday over the government's handling of disaster relief and its response to the collapse of the Fuxin No. 2 Elementary School, where as many as 129 children were buried alive. Earlier that day, dozens of parents marched to complain to higher authorities in Deyang, and, in a scene that has been widely publicized, were met by Mian- zhu's party secretary, Jiang Guohua, who kneeled and begged them to stop.

"None of us were listening to him. We all kept walking," said Chen Xuefen, 32, whose 11-year-old son was killed when the school crumbled. "They ignored us. It has been so many days since that day, but no one came to investigate. . . . I told him [Jiang], 'Now you're kneeling to us, but if you can return my son to me, our entire family will kneel to you for three days and nights.' "

Though some quake survivors have spoken of local officials going beyond their duty to help victims, it is the central government that has won overwhelming praise for its leadership and caring hand during the crisis that has claimed more than 67,000 lives.

"The central government is managing the situation much more skillfully, including its public image," said Minxin Pei, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

On Wednesday, Beijing said it would allocate $28.6 million to help Sichuan deal with swelling quake-spawned lakes that are at risk of overflowing and inundating hundreds of thousands of people downstream.

Jing Zhengfu, 36, a farmer in Mianzhu, put it this way: "The party is good. [President] Hu [Jintao] and [Premier] Wen [Jiabao] are good. But the local-level government is corrupted. . . . It's hard to find any honest officials here."

Such sentiments reflect a general dissatisfaction and mistrust of local government that experts say were bound to manifest themselves or become amplified in the wake of a disaster of this magnitude. Officials of towns, counties and cities are chosen by the local party leadership. Only about 1,000 officials at the provincial level are appointed by Beijing and serve at the will of the central government, Pei said. That makes it very difficult for Beijing to monitor or fire local leaders.

"It shows the existence of the corruption problem and the increasing conflicts between officials and ordinary people," said Hu Xingdou, a professor of economics at Beijing Institute of Technology.

Hu believes the airing of such grievances could lead to reforms that will bring a cleaner, more transparent and competent local government. Last week, a deputy bureau chief of civil affairs in Dujiangyan, a hard-hit resort area northwest of Chengdu, was dismissed by the local government for "inaccurate calculation of statistics" related to the earthquake.

China's chief justice this week pledged that courts would impose severe punishment for quake-related corruption. The central government has been battling graft and other abuse-of-power problems for years, but lacking resources and political reach, Beijing has focused on punishing egregious offenders to send a message to localities.

"I think smart officials sitting in Beijing would be thinking of using this [earthquake] incident to give local officials a good lesson," said Lynette Ong, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Toronto.

But Ong, who has done fieldwork in rural China, doubts significant reforms are ahead in local governance.

Finances remain a major concern in rural China, so while the publicity over school collapses is likely to bring scrutiny and oversight of construction, Ong said, that won't necessarily address problems in healthcare and other social programs. When the nation's attention on the quake diminishes, it remains to be seen how well local officials will deliver aid to help more than 5 million homeless people resettle and pick up their lives.

Nor does Ong see drastic changes in the government allowing protests or more aggressive media coverage of social issues and local leaders. "At the end of the day," she said, "it is social stability that the central government values most."

The May 21 protest in Luojiang, about 50 miles west of the epicenter in Wenchuan, stemmed from complaints that relief supplies -- bottled water, instant noodles and sausages -- had been stored in a children's clothing shop. Some residents say they believed the shop operators had close connections to local officials.

People in the area said police arrived May 21 and sealed the clothing shop and detained at least one person. Later in the day, crowds gathered at a square and began to question authorities about the case. Scuffles broke out and police arrested a number of students, witnesses said.

"People were shouting: 'Release the students! Take out disaster relief goods!' " said Sun Dejian, 25, a restaurant worker who watched the protest.

The protest was covered on local TV, but there's been little coverage since. A foreign reporter asking questions was tailed by a local official, who insisted that he should participate in interviews.

Asked why, he said, "Residents may not have the correct understanding."

don.lee@latimes.com

China Water: May 29, 2008: Chemicals in quake lakes pose hazards.

A terrible tragedy, with yet more complications for the water system.

It's interesting to compare this with last week's reports that water quality was not affected by the earthquake.

Peter Huston
===

http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/05/29/asia/OUKWD-UK-QUAKE1.php


Chemicals add to China's quake lake fears
By Tyra Dempster Reuters
Published: May 29, 2008

DUJIANGYAN, China: Five thousand tonnes of dangerous chemicals and heavy rain are adding to the mix of threats from one of China's "quake lakes" in danger of bursting their banks, a newspaper said on Thursday.

Illustrating the sense of urgency, the Finance Ministry said it was funnelling an extra 1 billion yuan (73 million pounds) into relief work on an estimated 35 quake lakes in addition to 400 million yuan already allotted to work on smaller, damaged dams.

About 5,000 tonnes of chemicals, including sulphuric and hydrochloric acid, were trapped downstream from the Tangjiashan lake and had to be moved to safe ground, the Beijing News said, citing local environmental authorities.

China has evacuated more than 150,000 people living below the swollen Tangjiashan lake, formed by the devastating May 12 earthquake, amid fears it could burst and trigger massive flooding.

The official death toll from the 7.9 magnitude quake is already more than 68,500 and is certain to rise further, with nearly 20,000 listed as missing. Aftershocks on Tuesday toppled 420,000 houses, many already uninhabitable.

The chemicals, adding pollution to the threat of flooding, were stranded in different work sites downstream from the lake, the newspaper said.

The Tangjiashan lake was created when landslides blocked the Jianjiang river above the town and county of Beichuan in mountainous Sichuan province, near the quake epicentre.

It has been raining at the site from early Thursday, hampering efforts by more than 600 soldiers to open a giant sluice to discharge floodwaters, Xinhua news agency said. Helicopters shipping in equipment were unable to take off.

Some 1,000 People's Liberation Army soldiers were making their way by foot to the lake, carrying more than 10 tonnes of diesel for bulldozers already there.

SUDDEN BREAK

Alexander Densmore, a seismologist at Durham University in Britain, said any break in a quake lake would likely be sudden.

"These landslide dams pose a really significant risk in these mountain regions, and in these narrow valleys it doesn't take much material to create a complete blockage," he said by phone.

Once a breach occurred, there could be an accelerating process leading to a sudden rush of water downstream.

"Once that process starts, it's virtually impossible to do anything to decrease the water... When they fail, they tend to fail catastrophically," he said of the quake dams.

Given the topography of Sichuan, with the western mountain country giving way to plains around Mianyang, a major rush of water could spill downstream and possibly affect lower-lying areas of cities such as Mianyang, he said.

The region along the faultline is densely packed with dams, raising concerns that if either the quake lakes or the weakened dams burst, the rush of water could cause others to fail.

A massive relief effort, which involves providing food, tents and clothing for millions and the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, including the many destroyed schools, is expected to take up to three years.

Donations from home and abroad had reached 37.3 billion yuan by Thursday, up 2.5 billion yuan from the previous day, the Information Office of the State Council said.

China did not confirm reports on Wednesday that it had requested aid from Japan.

"If the Japanese self-defence forces are ready to provide assistance, the specifics will be discussed at the defence departments of the two countries," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a news conference, adding that South Korean President Lee Myung-bak would visit Sichuan on Friday.

Thousands of injured have been transferred to other provinces and the capital for treatment. Song Liangwei, 9, had always dreamed of visiting Beijing, but not as a quake victim.

"I wanted to go to Tiananmen Square, to climb the Great Wall, and to watch the Olympic Games," he said.

(Writing by Nick Macfie; Additional reporting by Lindsay Beck, Chris Buckley, Guo Shipeng and Phyllis Xu in Beijing; Editing by Sanjeev Miglani)

China Water: May 29, 2008: Xinjiang water review.

This article is over two years old but contains good information on the water situation in Xinjiang.

Posted without further comment.

Peter Huston
===

http://english.gov.cn/2006-02/07/content_180358.htm


Water-saving agriculture promotes Xinjiang's rural economy
GOV.cn Tuesday, February 07, 2006

Xinjiang is located in the inner continental drought area. The lack of water resources becomes a bottleneck for its economic development. In order to ensure the sustainable development of Xinjiang's agricultural economy, during the 10th Five-year Plan, great efforts were put in Xinjiang in promoting the water saving agriculture; the annual saved water reached over 100 mln cubic meters. The water saving technique not only increased farmers' income, but also pushed forward the reform of agriculture production mode.

During the 10th Five-year Plan, Xinjiang's water saving work had accompanied with the whole process of the optimized allocation of water resources. It consistently improved the utilization efficiency of water resource. While intensifying the water saving reconstruction in large irrigation area, comprehensive agricultural development and quality cotton base construction, Xinjiang put great efforts in promoting spray, dripping and seeping irrigation as well as other advanced water saving technique.

Besides, the implementation of high-efficiency water saving project promoted the reform of agricultural production mode in project areas. Through setting down favorable policies, establishing new water saving system, intensifying pilot, and other measures, Xinjiang consistently strengthened the promotion of high-efficiency water saving work. During the period of the 10th 5-year Plan, Xinjiang has diffused 74 high-efficiency water saving demo projects in 45 counties and cities of 13 prefectures. With the total investment of 94 mln RMB, Xinjiang has totally constructed 276,700 mu of high-efficiency water saving irrigation area, saving over 100 mln cubic meters of water annually.

During the 11th 5-year Plan, Xinjiang will intensify the efforts on developing water-saving agriculture, so as to promote the development through saving water and build up irrigation support system for sustainable agricultural development, thus ensuring the construction of new socialist countryside.

Editor: Mo Honge
Source: Xinjiang.gov.cn

Taiwan Water: May 29, 2008: Green Island needs wastewater treatment plant.

Posted without comment.

Peter Huston

===

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/local/offshore%20islands/2008/05/29/158544/Green%2DIsland.htm


Thursday, May 29, 2008

Green Island urges water treatment system

CNA

TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Green Island, located off the southeastern coast of Taiwan, urgently needs a waste water treatment plant to prevent further pollution of its coastal waters and consequent damage to its coral reefs, a researcher said Wednesday.

Chen Chao-lun, a research fellow at the Biodiversity Research Center of Academia Sinica, said waste water is believed to be the prime cause of "black-band disease," which originates from a blue-green algae that kills off coral reefs.

Green Island, which housed political prisoners during Taiwan's martial law period, is now a favorite site for scuba divers because of the rich and diverse marine ecology supported by its coral reefs.

The island, which has a registered population of 3,000, is categorized as a township of Taitung County in eastern Taiwan.

Chen said further research is needed to determine whether waste water is directly related to black-band disease, but added that the research team led by Chen is sure that the most severe coral damage has occurred near the most densely populated areas of the island.

At least, an easy-to-use waste water treatment plant should be set up soon to help address the problem, Chen said.

Echoing Chen's appeal, an official at the East Coast National Scenic Area Administration said Green Island draws more than 300,000 visitors per year, which makes it urgent for a waste water treatment facility to be installed to help protect the island's ecology.

The official suggested that treatment plants for both rain water and waste water should be built at local schools, hotels and the prison, before installing larger systems for households.

According to an official at Taitung County's Environmental Protection Bureau, Green Island discharges up to 1,550 tons of waste water per day into the sea.

The central government had planned to build waste water treatment systems in three of the island's villages. However, authorities in charge of the plan had the second thoughts and decided instead to build a recycling and reuse facility, the official said, adding that further evaluation is needed.

Wednesday, May 28, 2008

China Water: May 28, 2008: A Cautionary tale from the Northeast.

On February 29, 2008, I wrote the following for the trade magazine that dealt with water. Note that this is not a new story. It ran on February 11, 2008.

I think it serves as an important cautionary lesson for people who wish to do business in China. It also helps explain my comment (in the post that follows) that I question China's ability to enforce its own laws.

Peter Huston
===

BEIJING — Despite widespread interest in the China water market, one of Suez Group’s experiences there could serve as a warning, says a February 11 Business Week story.

In 2000 Suez Group, a French company, signed a $1.6 million deal to set up a joint venture in Siping. Siping is a city of 3 million in Jilin province, located in China’s financially-strapped northeastern region (sometimes known as Manchuria.)

A written agreement from the Siping municipal government promised that Suez’s partner, the Siping Municipal Water Co. (SMW), would buy a fixed amount of water from the French company every year.

The municipal government also promised to crack down on illegal water well drilling by local companies. Because the illegal wells were obtaining water without payment as well as reducing demand for water from municipal sources, putting a stop to the practice was required to ensure profitability for the joint-venture, according to Business Week.

Now the deal has fallen apart in several ways and Suez is uncertain how to collect the debt, says the story.

In 2001, the first problem occurred when SMW refused to pay Suez, claiming budget problems. This left the company with many local expenses but little local income.

Around the same time, SMW, a Chinese state-owned company, began privatizing. As part of the privatization effort, assets were transferred to the newly created company, Siping Longyuan Water.

Siping Longyuan Water then began to compete for services in Siping with Suez. And in 2006, Siping Municipal Water, the former state-owned company, filed for bankruptcy, still owing Suez money. Siping Longyuan Water, although having a historical connection to SMW, denies responsibility for its debts.

“It’s not us that owes the joint-venture money. It was the government that made the promise. The government owes them money,” Liu Xiaodong, general manager of Siping Longyuan Water, said in the article. Siping Longyuan Water also argues they have not been able to buy as much water from Suez as promised in the original joint venture because of poor demand on the part of their customers.

In the more than seven years that have passed since the city promised a crackdown on illegal water wells, little has changed, the story said. Although the municipal government has passed laws and issued edicts against the practice, enforcement has been lax, and the city is still full of illegal water wells. This lax enforcement is in part due to the belief that if the wells were not allowed to remain, businesses might leave the city and move elsewhere.

The Siping municipal government has tried to improve the problem with Suez, by promising them a subsidy, but this led to further frustrations. “Because the government did not close down the underground wells, [it] has agreed to give Sino-French Water Development a subsidy to cover their losses," said Zhang Ziyong, head of the Siping Municipal Public Utilities Bureau, in the article. “But because some of the subsidy still hasn’t been paid, the French aren’t very happy.”

Suez has met with the provincial governor and renegotiated with the mayor. Still, there’s been little success in receiving payment. “It’s the difference between can’t and won’t. We assumed that they couldn’t pay because of the financial difficulties, so we appreciated that,” Steve Clark, executive director of Sino French Water Development, was quoted as saying in the article. “Now I’m sure they can pay.”

The article concludes by saying that Suez, which has several other projects in China that are successful, intends to be more careful about investing in projects in China, particularly in its less-wealthy regions.

===


http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2008/gb20080211_112680.htm



Corporation February 11, 2008, 6:58AM EST text size: TT
A French Water Company's Cautionary Tale in China
Suez Group, a global player in water treatment projects, is shying away from China's impoverished northeast after a joint venture in Siping turned bad

by Chi-Chu Tschang
Asia


Paris-based Suez Group (SZE) is a global player in the business of water treatment plants—those elaborate systems built to purify water and deliver it to a local utility or directly to customers. Suez has targeted China for a major drive. That makes sense: 312 million Chinese, or a quarter of the population, do not have clean water to drink.

By and large the venture has been successful. But in Siping, an urban area of 3 million in China's impoverished northeast, Suez can't get paid despite years of trying. Its project in Siping, though small (Suez invested $1.6 million), has turned into a cautionary tale not just for investors interested in China's water treatment industry but also for all foreigners doing business in China—even in a surefire business like water.

Like many local governments throughout China in the late 1990s, Siping welcomed foreign investors with open arms, hoping they could help build infrastructure projects the local government couldn't afford to build. In 2000, Suez signed a deal to set up a joint-venture water treatment plant in Siping. The French secured a written guarantee from the Siping municipal government promising that Suez's state-owned Chinese partner, Siping Municipal Water Co., would buy a fixed amount of water from the joint venture every year.
City Customer Files for Bankruptcy

The authorities also pledged to close down the city's underground wells within three years. Factories had long been illegally digging the wells to get free water, so shutting them down was key to the profitability of the Suez venture. "A lot of industries and customers in Siping itself take water from underground wells. So they are not buying it from Siping Water Co., which reduces the amount that they sell, so that impacts them financially," says Steve Clark, executive director of Sino French Water Development.

But after the first year, in 2001, Siping Municipal Water failed to pay Suez's joint venture for water, claiming to be financially strapped. Without the money, Siping Sino French Water Supply, the joint venture, has been unable to pay taxes, repair equipment, or pay wages. .

Suez is now having trouble figuring out who to pressure to get its money. Siping Municipal Water's management began privatizing the state-owned enterprise in 2001 and eventually transferred all of its assets to a newly restructured company called Siping Longyuan Water. The new entity actually competes head-to-head with Suez's joint venture in offering water treatment services. Without operating assets, Siping Municipal Water applied for bankruptcy in 2006, claiming it owes creditors, including the Suez joint venture, $2 million.
Free Well Water, Tepid Demand

But Siping Longyuan Water, the new entity, is not honoring the creditors' claims. "It's not us that owes the joint venture money. It was the government that made the promise. The government owes them money," says Liu Xiaodong, general manager of Siping Longyuan Water. Efforts to reach the Siping mayor or his representatives were unsuccessful. Besides, Siping Longyuan Water argues, it hasn't been able to buy the agreed upon amount of water from Suez's joint venture due to tepid demand from its own customers.

One cause of that poor demand is all the illegal wells dug in the city. Despite numerous promises and edicts, the local government has failed to shut down the wells out of fear local companies will close or go elsewhere if they actually have to pay for water. The government has hoped to smooth over the problem in the short term by compensating Sino-French Water so it doesn't not lose too much money on the joint venture. "Because the government did not close down the underground wells, [it] has agreed to give Sino-French Water Development a subsidy to cover their losses," says Zhang Zhiyong, head of Siping Municipal Public Utilities Bureau. "But because some of the subsidy still hasn't been paid, the French aren't very happy."

A French Water Company's Cautionary Tale in China

(page 2 of 2)

Suez has tried quietly to resolve its problems in Siping. The company's senior management gained a private audience with the provincial governor. Soon after, Siping's mayor renegotiated the contract with the French, who granted the Chinese more lenient terms. But even with the renegotiated contract, Siping has not paid. "It's the difference between can't and won't. We [had] assumed that they couldn't pay because of the financial difficulties, so we appreciated that," says Clark. "Now, I'm sure they can pay."
Asking for a Fair Price

Suez could sue or take its Chinese partners to arbitration, but the French company has 21 joint-venture water treatment facilities in China, including Siping, and is wary of how its other Chinese partners may react if lawyers get involved. "They don't want to be the pioneer to bring the government and Chinese partner either to court or to arbitration. It may have a negative image for them," says attorney Leo Zhou, who worked for Suez trying to resolve its dispute in Siping.

This is not the first time foreign investors have tried investing in China's water treatment industry and suffered. Thames Water Utilities of Britain, Hong Kong's China Water, and several financial investors have already pulled out of China's water treatment industry after going through similar experiences. In the best-case scenario, the local government will buy out the foreign partner, as the Shanghai municipal government did with Thames' water treatment project in 2004. Suez would happily sell its stake to the Siping municipal government if it could get a fair price for it.
Bad for the Region

For now, Suez is shying away from making further investments in northeastern China and other smaller, poorer Chinese cities. "Quite frankly, our experience in Siping means that we are very careful about which areas of China we go into," says Clark. He adds that Suez is making money on its other water treatment projects in China, particularly in the wealthier coastal regions. During French president Nicolas Sarkozy's state visit to China in late November, Suez signed new deals with Chongqing and Tianjin. The company's experience in Siping—which has an annual per-capita gross domestic product of $1,279—illustrates why Beijing's efforts to revive the northeast have been frustrated.

Based on Suez's original projections of Siping's demand for water, the joint venture hoped to build a second water treatment plant in the city. Now Suez won't go near Siping or anywhere in northeastern China. "This is an extremely huge loss for Siping, because if the Siping municipal government has lost its creditworthiness, not just investors in the water industry but no other investor will dare invest there now," says Chen Jining, professor at Tsinghua University's Water Policy Research Center.

Tschang is a correspondent in BusinessWeek's Beijing bureau

China Water: May 28, 2008: China's green future?

I'm not sure how much of this editorial I agree with, but let's say I am listening carefully and taking a wait and see attitude. Although my cynicism stems from a wary attitude towards China's ability and willingness to enforce its own laws, both in ecological matters and elsewhere, this piece does fit in well with the GE Press Releases.

Perhaps these highly educated gentlemen truly do know more about the situation than I do.

Peter Huston

===

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/05/27/ED2K10U856.DTL


This article appeared on page B - 9 of the San Francisco Chronicl

Open Forum
China just might surprise the U.S. on climate change

Tony Haymet,Susan Shirk

Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Opinion


.Open Forum
.Sunday Insight

The next American administration should be prepared for a China that is getting serious about the climate change issue for its own domestic reasons. Chinese experts understand that global warming will affect their country much more severely than North America.

North China already suffers from persistent drought and south China from devastating floods. These conditions pose political as well as economic and social risks. Geopolitical instability caused by global warming may well spread through the rest of south Asia. This gives the Chinese government great motivation to address the problem.

The Chinese government ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 after the United States withdrew from it. Last year, the government elevated the group coordinating climate change efforts to a "national leading group" directly under China's cabinet and led by Premier Wen Jiabao, a clear sign that the issue was becoming a higher priority.

China's leaders face little bottom-up pressure to take action on climate change and they believe that they have to keep the economy growing at a rate of more than 7 percent per year in order to prevent blue-collar protests. But domestic environmental problems are becoming a potential political threat to Chinese Communist Party rule. The United States cleaned up most of its local air and water pollution decades ago, but in China, pollution has gotten worse and worse, triggering widespread social unrest.

China improved energy conservation during the first two decades of its market reform and is now making a new commitment. In 2005, its government pledged that, over the next five years, it would reduce energy use by 20 percent and its main pollutants by 10 percent. With economic growth surging into double digits, they failed to meet their 4 percent annual energy efficiency targets during 2006 and 2007. But they now have forced provincial governors to sign energy efficiency contracts and threatened to fire them and withhold approval for major construction projects if they don't improve efficiency by at least 2 percent per year.

Another powerful force at work is technology transfer. Until now the dialogue about emissions-reducing technology has been framed as "the United States has it" and "China wants it for too low a price." But very soon the technology leaders, especially on price, may well be in China. China's entrepreneurs are already planning to market green technology to South America, Africa, and - yes - the United States. The deals have already begun. Before the Summer Olympics, China and Australia plan to open a small coal-fired power station capable of capturing carbon-dioxide emissions on the outskirts of Beijing.

As American carbon-capture projects such as FutureGen are delayed indefinitely by political squabbles and technology questions, who is to say that the first coal-fired plant on U.S. soil that captures some of its waste carbon dioxide will not come from overseas? (FutureGen is a $1.5 billion public-private partnership between the U.S. Department of Energy and a consortium of international energy companies to build a coal-fueled, near-zero-emissions power plant.)

Chinese experts use the word "irrelevant" in reference to America as a player in the green technology game. Hearing this term repeated during our recent visit left us with the strong impression that anyone waiting for a good price before selling such technology to China shouldn't wait too long.

China is rapidly developing its own clean energy technology and has a clear market target in the rest of the developing world. China is looking for ways to show the world that it is a responsible stakeholder, especially in the lead-up to the Summer Olympics. Beijing is perfectly capable of making a significant climate-change deal with Europe and Japan, perhaps even in time for the G-8 + 5 summit that Japan is hosting in July - leaving the United States "irrelevant" and playing catch-up.

Tony Haymet and Susan Shirk are professors of oceanography and chemistry, and China and Pacific relations, respectively, at UC San Diego. Haymet is director of Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and Shirk is director of the UC Systemwide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and author of "China: Fragile Superpower," (Oxford University Press, 2007).